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Hunting Causes and Using Them: 
 Is There No Bridge from Here to There?1 
 
Nancy Cartwright  
with Sophia Efstathiou 
 
LSE and UCSD 
 
Abstract 
 
Causation is in trouble –at least as it is pictured in current theories 
in philosophy and in economics as well, where causation is also 
once again in fashion. In both disciplines the accounts of causality 
on offer are either modelled too closely on one or another favoured 
method for hunting causes or on assumptions about the uses to 
which causal knowledge can be put – generally for predicting the 
results of our efforts to change the world. The first kind of account 
supplies no reason to think that causal knowledge, as it is pictured, 
is of any use; the second supplies no reason to think our best 
methods will be  reliable for establishing causal knowledge. So, if 
these accounts are all there is to be had, how do we get from 
method to use? Of what use is knowledge of causal laws that we 
work so hard to obtain? 
 
I. Two Actions: Hunting Causes and Using Causes 
 
Philosophic – and economic – accounts of causality are almost always 
rooted in ideas about either how to HUNT causes or how to USE them; 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP) meeting in 
London in the summer of 2007. It develops ideas presented in a more roundabout way in Cartwright 
(2006) ‘Where is the Theory in our “Theories” of Causality?’ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. CIII, no. 2. 
2006, pp. 55-66 and in Cartwright (2007) Hunting Causes and Using Them, Cambridge University 
Press. Support for the research and completion of the paper was provided by the AHRC project 
Contingency and Dissent in Science, by the University of California at San Diego Senate, by the 
University of California Humanities Research Institute, by the Institute for Advanced Study at Durham 
University and by the Spencer Foundation; we are grateful to all for their help. 
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but not both simultaneously. Most are almost directly read off either a 
favoured method of establishing causal claims – putting the label ‘causal’ 
onto a claim – or a favoured use we expect to make of causal claims –  
inferences to claims of practical use. Accounts based on methods for 
hunting causes include the probabilistic theory of causality and its 
descendent Bayes-nets theories, accounts based on experimental methods 
(like the Galilean experiments discussed below), most versions of causal 
process theories and theories that rely on exchanges of conserved 
quantities or the like and the usual counterfactual accounts. Those rooted 
in use include manipulation and intervention accounts, those based in 
causal decision theory and counterfactual accounts that allow realistic 
implementations.  
 
Almost all these accounts are good ones, Cartwright has argued – good for 
specific purposes in specific kinds of systems.2 And, taken together, they 
cover both rules for entry into the language of causality and for exit from 
causal language. The problem is that there is no bridge from one to the 
other. What assures us that the knowledge we hunt at such great effort 
and cost can be put to the uses we want to make of it?  To be practicable a 
theory of causation must simultaneously ground how we label features as 
‘causes’ and the inferences we make once the label is attached. So we 
need a theory of causation that gives us in one fell swoop both methods 
for inferring causes and methods for using them. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, trying to remain relatively neutral about 
just what causal laws are since we will consider a variety of different 
accounts, we propose that one think of a causal law as a law-like causal 
regularity: ‘C causes E’ constitutes a causal law if C regularly causes E – 
and that’s no accident.  
 
To illustrate our points about hunting and use we shall discuss four 
philosophical accounts of causal laws besides Cartwright’s own  
                                                 
2 Nancy Cartwright (2007), Hunting Causes and Using Them, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2, 
pp. 11-24. 
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• James Woodward’s ‘level’ invariance account3  
• related accounts based on ‘Galilean’ experiments4 
• Lewis-style (‘miracle’-based) counterfactuals5  
• probabilistic theories of causality.6 
 
All these are geared towards hunting causes: they ensure that we are 
“correct” in putting causal labels on. But they say little about what we 
can do with “causal” knowledge once we have it. On the other side we 
shall describe Woodward’s ‘modularity’ assumption and the kind of 
assumptions economists are wont to make about causality that guarantee 
its usefulness.7 We pick these for discussion because they allow us to 
illustrate our points fairly simply and vividly. 
 
 
II. Two Problems: Unstable Enablers and External Validity 
 
We tend to assume that the knowledge we secure with our best methods 
for testing casual laws carried out in the best circumstances is knowledge 
that we can use directly: in knowing the causal law we know how to 
change effects by changing their causes and we can make reliable 
predictions about the results of so doing. We seem to take some 
connection there as  given.8 But why should one make this assumption? 
When if ever is it justified? 
                                                 
3 James Woodward (2003) Making Things Happen, Oxford University Press, New York.  
4 Cf Ronald Giere’s Understanding Scientific Reasoning. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1979. 
5 David Lewis (1973) “Causation”, Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556-67. 
6 Esp. Patrick Suppes (1970) A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
7 Among philosophers we discuss Woodward rather than other accounts (eg. Peter Menzies and Huw 
Price (1993) “Causation as a secondary quality”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 187—
203, Douglas Gasking (1955) “Causation and Recipes”, Mind 64, 479-87 or Georg Henrik von Wright 
(1971) Explanation and Understanding) because his two separate conditions directly illustrate the 
distinction between characterizations of causality rooted in hunting methodologies and those that 
work to guarantee use.  
8 Cf. Cartwright’s early paper ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’, Nous, 13, 419-37 (also published in 
Cartwright (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press) or the spate of work at about 
the same time on causal decision theory (for instance in Harper, W. L., Stalnaker, R.  and Pearse, G. 
(eds.) 1981, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time, Dordrecht: Reidel.) 
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Philosophic accounts of causation based on hunting methodologies give 
no satisfactory answer to these questions. The conditions our accounts 
need to secure causal knowledge are not sufficient to secure the 
inferences that would put them to use. These accounts face two problems.   
 
1. Unstable enablers: changes in the enabling factors that support 
causal laws – a problem commonly recognized in economics.  
2. External validity: the problem of generalizing from a particular 
setting or population to the one of interest. 
 
 
II.1 Unstable Enablers 
 
Economists have worried about the stability of causal laws and their use 
for policy prediction since at least the time of John Stuart Mill.9  We go to 
the trouble of setting economic policy on the assumption that the factors 
we propose to use as policy levers can change and that our casual laws 
will allow us to predict what will follow on from that. But features in the 
economy that permit change in the ways we like and can predict allow 
for change in ways that we don’t like and worse, often in ways that we 
can’t predict. Our very attempts to use our causal laws may undermine 
the laws themselves. Instabilities in the causal laws we establish may not 
only result when we interfere to set policy, they may arise naturally as 
well, and at times and places we often have no way of knowing.  What 
use then are causal laws for prediction?  
 
Mill was pessimistic. He argued that economics cannot be an inductive 
science because the background arrangements of causes fluctuate and do 
so erratically, both naturally and as a result of deliberate actions by us. 
Any effect consequent on a particular cause depends, he argued, on a 
large background of other causal factors simultaneously at work as well, 
                                                 
9 John Stuart Mill (1836 [1967]) “On the Definition of Political Economy and on the Method of 
Philosophical Investigation in that Science”, reprinted in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. IV, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
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factors we are rarely able to identify. The effects consequent on a cause 
on one occasion, or over a period of time, cannot be relied on to occur on 
other occasions since this myriad of other causes is likely to change and 
in ways we cannot predict. So, concluded Mill, the sea of other causal 
factors that enable a particular factor to bring about a particular effect are 
rarely in place long enough to allow us to make new predictions based on 
past regular associations between the two factors. 
 
Besides variations in the arrangements of causes themselves Mill was also 
concerned about a second kind of possibly unstable enabler: changes in 
the underpinning structures that give rise to causal laws in the first place. 
It is a common experience of everyday life that what causal laws hold in a 
situation depends on the underlying structure that gives rise to them. 
Pressing a lever in a toaster causes the bread to drop into the toaster and 
brown, pressing a lever on the floor of the driver’s side of a Rover causes 
the car to accelerate. Putting a pound coin into a vending machine in the 
UK causes a bag of crisps to drop into the tray, putting a pound coin into 
a similar looking machine in the USA just gums up the works. For most of 
these man-made devices the usual ways of manipulating the cause to 
achieve the predicted effect will not gum up the works. They are 
typically well-shielded to prevent just that happening.  
 
The structural features that give rise to causal laws at work in the 
economy may be far more porous however. Like Mill, the early 
econometricians worried about just that. More recently Chicago School 
economists like Robert Lucas argue more strongly: not only can active 
policy intervention change the underlying structural arrangements in 
ways that undermine the very causal laws that are being relied on to 
predict the outcomes of those interventions; it is very likely this will 
happen. If interventions are expected, so argues the Chicago School, 
agents will change their behaviours and in just such a way as to 
undermine the established causal relations that predictions are based on.10  
                                                 
10 Robert Lucas (1976) “Economic Policy Evaluation: A Critique”, in Lucas, R. (1981) Studies in 
Business Cycle Theory. Basil Blackwell. Oxford, and Robert Lucas (1988) “On the Mechanics of 
Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, January 1988, 22, 3-32. 
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On the other hand, despite being worrisome, causal laws can be unstable 
in predictable, even happy ways. Take an example from Mill’s On the 
Subjugation of Women.11 In this essay Mill notes that many (like August 
Comte, one of his chief adversaries on this issue) maintain that there is a 
well-established (very law-like) causal regularity between being a woman 
and being inept at leadership, reasoning and imagination. Happily this 
causal law is not stable under changes in the underlying enabling 
structure that supports it. Change the social structure so that the 
upbringing, roles, education and experiences of women are more like 
those of 19th century British middle-class men and the causal laws 
relating sex to leadership, reasoning and imagination shift dramatically. 
The enabling factors that hold the regularity fixed change in more or less 
expected ways, and luckily so.  
 
To see how the problem of unstable enablers plays out in a current 
philosophical account of causation, let us turn to James Woodward.12  
Woodward claims that two requirements must be satisfied by a relation 
before we can call it a causal law. The first requirement is level 
invariance (modularity comes later): 
  
• Level invariance: a relationship between putative causes and an 
effect is level invariant if the relationship stays fixed as any 
putative cause in the relationship varies ‘by intervention’. 
 
‘Intervention’ is hard to define properly. It is something like a ‘miracle’ in 
the Lewis account of counterfactuals: a change in the cause at the last 
stage while all other causes from the set of causal laws operating in the 
situation remain the same, except for changes induced by the change in 
the targeted factor (sometimes called by philosophers, changes ‘causally 
downstream’ from the targeted change). 
                                                 
11 John Stuart Mill (1869  [1997]) The Subjection of Women, Dover Publications, 1997. 
12Cf. James Woodward (2003) Making Things Happen, Oxford University Press, New York and Sandra 
Mitchell (2003) Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, who stresses the need for invariance without a detour through causality.  
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When it comes to causality Woodward focuses on systems of linear 
deterministic causal laws that look like this: 
 
Linear deterministic causal law 
z c= ax + by 
 
The symbol ‘c=’ means that the left and right-hand side are equal and that 
the factors on the right are a complete set of causes of those on the left. 
(Reference to the population and circumstances is repressed as is usual in 
presentation.) Applied to z c= ax + by, level invariance dictates that the 
functional relationship z = ax + by must hold as x varies13 while y and all 
the true causes in causal laws at work in the situation (except those 
causally downstream from the change in x) stay fixed; and the functional 
relation also holds as y varies and x and other causes stay fixed.  
 
Woodward supports his claims arguing by contradiction: he considers 
various examples in which level invariance is violated by relations known 
to be spurious.14 The canonical example is the relationship between a 
storm and the reading of a barometer. Storms are caused by fluctuations 
in the relative pressure of atmospheric fluids so we can relate the 
presence of a storm to a function of atmospheric pressure by writing, say,  
 
(1) storm = f (pressure).  
 
The level of a well-functioning barometer, an instrument designed to 
measure pressure, should also depend on atmospheric pressure, according 
to a relationship like  
 
(2) barometer level = g (pressure).  
 
                                                 
13 The range of permitted variation of variable must be specified as well. Mention of the relativization 
to these ranges is suppressed as well. 
14Cf. James Woodward (2003) Making Things Happen, Oxford University Press, New York. 
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One can mathematically solve (2) for pressure in terms of the inverse 
function g’ and substitute into (1) to relate the presence of a storm to the 
reading of a barometer: 
 
(3) storm = f (g'(barometer level)).  
 
The question is which of (1), (2) or (3) describes a genuine causal law. 
 
The true causal laws at work in the situation contain three variables: 
pressure, storm, barometer level. We expect that equation (1) would 
continue to obtain if pressure were varied ‘by miracle’ with barometer 
level staying fixed. So it should pass the level invariance test. So too does 
(2) since it would not change if pressure were changed by a miracle while 
the presence or absence of the storm stays fixed. Equation (3) on the 
other hand, while it may be useful for calculating the likelihood of a 
storm given that the instrument is functioning correctly, does not express 
a causal law and this shows up in the level invariance test: if the pressure 
stays fixed while the barometer level changes ‘by miracle’ (say it just 
explodes), the relationship between the storm and the reading of the 
barometer changes. It is well-known that you can’t bring on the storm by 
breaking the glass! 
 
Cartwright has elsewhere supported Woodward’s emphasis on level 
invariance by showing it that is a sufficient condition for causality.15 She  
does so by proving a kind of representation theorem for level invariance 
vis-à-vis causal laws. The theorem uses some fairly straightforward 
axioms that a set of causal laws should satisfy – like asymmetry, 
irreflexivity and the assumption that any functional relations that hold 
are generated by genuine causal relations. These are all axioms that are 
presupposed in most discussions of causality and in particular in the 
examples that Woodward employs. The theorem then shows that any 
functional relation generated by a set of causal laws will be one of those 
                                                 
15 See Cartwright (2003) ‘Two Theorems on Invariance and Causality’, Philosophy of Science 70, pp. 
203-224; reprinted in Cartwright (2007) Hunting Causes and Using Them, Cambridge University Press. 
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causal laws if and only if it is level invariant.16 So given a set of ‘true’ 
causal laws like (1) and (2) no spurious relation derived from them will be 
level invariant.17  
 
Despite the fact that level invariance ensures that a functional 
relationship is a causal law given the axioms laid down for causal laws, 
Woodward thinks this is not enough. He adds a second condition, 
modularity, which we shall discuss below. But Cartwright, to the 
contrary, takes the theorem to prove that level invariance is sufficient. In 
that case level invariance is a good – indeed sure – way to HUNT causes, 
to put a causal label onto a relationship. If a relationship satisfies this 
condition we have conclusive reason to think it is causal. But does level 
invariance get around Mill and Lucas’s problem?  
 
Unfortunately it does not. (And we will later argue that modularity 
doesn’t really do better either.) Looking for level invariant laws 
presupposes that factors in causal laws are not erratically interacting with 
the causal structures that give rise to them.18  
 
Consider again Mill’s original example of the subjugation of women. The 
relationship between sex and leadership could well have been constant 
across a very great many variations in other causes affecting leadership 
                                                 
16 Cartwright takes these axioms to be fairly innocuous and to be true of causal laws even if her 
singular-causings account of causal laws is mistaken. NC notes that there has been some objection that 
the axioms are not so innocuous because a transitivity axiom is included. But the transitivity axiom 
assumes only that if x appears as a cause of y in a linear deterministic causal system, we still have a 
causal law for y if we substitute for x the right-hand side of any causal law that has x as effect. This is 
necessary unless we are willing to assume that causation in nature is not continuous in time, so that 
there is a notion of direct causal law (the ‘last’ law in operation before the effect is produced) that is not 
representation relative and that it is this notion of direct causal law that we are trying to characterize. 
17ibid. 
18 It also supposes a relatively clear separation between the structure (what Cartwright calls the 
‘nomological machine’) that gives rise to a set of causal laws and the laws themselves. Cartwright has 
defended this division in Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement (1989) OUP and in The Dappled 
World (1999) CUP. NC does not think it is universally applicable though. But she does think it can be 
made practically everywhere where there are causal laws at work that can be represented in the usual 
triangular array of equations, whether those equations represent deterministic or probabilistic causality 
and whether they are linear or not. For more discussion see Efstathiou (manuscript) “Nomological 
Machines In Scientific Practice”. 
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over the centuries, constant enough to count it as level invariant. It was 
throughout a true causal law: being a woman caused one to be weak at 
leadership. But if we transform the structure of society changing the role 
and experiences of women from birth onwards, the relationship may well 
no longer satisfy Woodward’s condition of level invariance. So the well-
established causal law would be no guide for predicting the effect of sex 
on leadership skills if the structure is changed. The invariance of a 
relationship under changes in variables in the other causal laws at work 
does not ensure predictability unless underlying enabling structures stay 
fixed. But that we cannot expect structural causal enablers to remain 
stable is just the Lucas critique!  
 
 
II.2 External validity 
 
A second problem many current theories of causality have to grapple 
with is external validity. This is a well-known problem in methodology. 
Many of the methods that allow us to establish causal-law claims most 
securely can be applied in only very narrow settings.  We establish results 
very securely in a particular experimental setting or a particular test 
population. But the method itself provides no basis for extending the 
results to a population or setting different from that in the test. Theories 
of causality that are too closely tied to these kinds of method will suffer 
from the same problem; the very way causal laws are characterized makes 
causal laws very narrow in their scope and thus very limited in their 
predictive power. 
 
Consider a standard method for hunting causes: Galilean experiments. 
The goal in a Galilean experiment is dual. First we wish to eliminate all 
confounders, then to establish a law-like regularity between cause and 
effect with no confounders to interfere. We can eliminate confounders 
by physically isolating an experimental system from background 
interference and/or by making various idealizing assumptions. The 
problem is that establishing the presence of a causal relation in absence of 
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confounders does not ensure that the same causal relation persists once 
confounders are present.  
 
Suppose we establish via a perfect Galilean experiment that C causes E. 
Call the set of confounding factors – the ones we work so hard to 
eliminate in the experiment – ‘N’ (for ‘nasties’). Then what we have 
actually established in the experiment is  
 
C&¬N c E   
 
from which we cannot infer  
 
C&N c E. 
 
But that is the kind of result we need for reliable prediction if we want to 
use C to control E in real life settings. Inferring that a cause will have the 
same effect whether or not confounders are present is a logical fallacy.  
 
Any characterization of causal laws that reads them off from the results 
of a Galilean experiment will have even worse troubles. In that case 
causal laws will end up by definition to hold only in situations where 
confounders are absent. 
 
External validity is also a problem for David Lewis’s counterfactual 
account of causation. Lewis counterfactuals establish a causal link by 
changing the cause at the last instant by a miracle-like intervention that 
removes the cause while leaving everything else the same. If the effect 
does not obtain once the cause – and only the cause – is absent then a 
causal relationship is established.  
 
Although Lewis offers his account as an account of singular causal 
relations, it is also the basis for related accounts of causal laws. But as an 
account of causal laws it suffers from the problem of external validity. 
Any inferential power we get from Lewis counterfactuals pertains to a 
particular setting – whatever setting is under consideration, the setting in 
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which the miracle will intervene to change the putative cause. Even 
though the setting is not an idealized one, if we follow Lewis we establish 
a law-like causal regularity for only one kind of setting. Unless further 
assumptions are made there are no guarantees that the causal law 
established is resilient to a different background arrangement of 
confounders. So Lewis counterfactuals can lay down causal laws for 
settings where confounders occur, but only for the specific arrangement 
of them under consideration. It is no help for any different arrangement. 
 
What we know from Lewis counterfactuals is that for some specific N 
 
C&N cE. 
   
This does not imply any results for some different N'. In particular it is a 
logical fallacy to conclude that 
 
 C&N' c E. 
 
The same cause need not have the same effect under a new arrangement 
of confounders.  
 
External validity is also a problem for an account more akin to 
Cartwright’s own: the probabilistic theory of causality developed by 
Patrick Suppes. This account is almost read off statistical methods for 
inferring causal laws from observational (as opposed to experimental) 
data: stratify on all possible confounders, then look for correlations 
between the putative cause and effect within each stratum. One fairly 
good attempt at formulating the probabilistic theory (for yes-no 
variables) says that C is a cause of E in a particular arrangement of 
confounders, say K if and only if the cause increases the probability of the 
effect in that arrangement: P(E/C&K) > P(E/¬C&K).19 This of course 
                                                 
19  The formulation given here still isn’t quite right because K must not hold fixed any causal 
intermediaries by which C causes E on a given occasion. Cartwright’s own best attempt relies on 
reference to singular causings even in the formulation of the probabilistic theory.  See Cartwright 
(1989) Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement, Oxford University Press, sections 2 and 3 and 
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makes it explicit that casual laws are situation relative.20 C causes E 
simpliciter if it does so in all arrangements of confounders.  
 
But once more, the mere hap that under a particular arrangement of 
confounders the cause increases the probability of the effect gives little 
information about what happens in a different arrangement of 
confounders. As before 
 
P(E/C&K) > P(E/¬C&K)   
 
does not imply  
 
P(E/C&K') > P(E/¬C&K'). 
 
We have again no logical grounds for inferences in settings different from 
the ones our laws are derived in. And again as before, if we use the 
probabilistic theory to characterize what a causal law is the problem is 
even worse since by definition the same law cannot hold in different 
settings. One may of course look to the non-relativized law: C causes E 
simpliciter. In this case causal laws become more useful but incredibly 
hard to hunt – we then need reason to suppose that the increase in 
probability will hold across all arrangements of confounders. That we 
certainly do not get just by looking at what happens in any one or 
handful of such arrangements.   
 
So, here we see three familiar accounts of causality – the probabilistic 
theory, the counterfactual account, and accounts read off from the theory 
of the Galilean experiment. All three are rooted in methods for hunting 
causes. And all three are very good at what they do – putting a causal 
label on a relationship only where it seems correct to do so. That’s not 
surprising since the methods they are based on are among our surest 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cartwright (2007) Hunting Causes and Using Them, Cambridge University Press, for a fuller 
discussion.  
20 As usual the population relativity is buried in the probability measure. The laws hold for any 
population for which the assumed probability measure holds. 
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methods for casual inference. But all three face the trouble of external 
validity once it comes to USING causes.  
 
Galilean experiments establish conditions sufficient for attaching a causal 
label on a feature. If changes in C and C alone are followed by E in 
idealized settings with no confounders this is sufficient for C to be a cause 
of E. But notice, the changes must be in C alone and the setting must be 
ideal. Similarly Lewis counterfactuals are supposed to give conditions 
sufficient for attaching a causal label. If changes in C and C alone are 
followed by E given a specific arrangement of confounders this is 
sufficient for C to cause E – but only in cases where C alone is changed 
and where the confounders are arranged in just the same way. 
Probabilistic causality tells us to attach a causal label if changes in C and 
C alone are followed by an increase in the probability of the effect given 
a specific arrangement of confounders. This is again sufficient for C to 
cause E but only when C alone is changed in just the specified 
arrangement of confounders. 
 
How then can we use causal knowledge obtained in a Galilean 
experiment for predictions about what will happen when confounders 
are in place or when factors other than C change as well? How can we 
infer something from one “nasty” setting about what effects follow the 
cause in another one using Lewis counterfactuals? How can we use 
probabilistic causality to infer from one case where the presence of the 
cause makes the effect more probable something about other cases where 
the same cause is known to be present but other causes have changed?  
 
These are well known problems in the methodology of causal inference. 
But methodologists have a way to deal with them that philosophers 
cannot adopt. Methodologists often seem to suppose that there is 
something, they know not what exactly it is – a causal law – that can be 
established in a variety of different ways, then used for prediction in a 
variety of ways and situations different yet again. Causal laws are 
something like the charge of an electron or valency of oxygen in this 
respect.  
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We philosophers, however, aim to say what a causal law is, or at least to 
give some significant characterizing features of it, and to do so in a way 
that makes sense both of the ways we hunt causes and the ways we use 
them. But many of our attempts are too operationalistic so not 
surprisingly they suffer from the standard troubles of operationalism. If a 
concept is defined too closely to one or another way we test for it, we 
cannot account for why other test methods are reasonable and we cannot 
underwrite the usual inferences we make with the concept. Conversely, 
if a concept is defined too closely to one or another of the inferences we 
make using it, nothing about the concept supports other inferences nor 
grounds any methods for testing if the concept applies.     
 
Current theoretical accounts of causation based on hunting 
methodologies are sufficient for identifying the cause of an effect in a 
particular situation; they do not give us methods for navigating to new 
settings. They only tell us where we are, not how we can get to where we 
want to go.  
 
 
III. Unstable Enablers and External Validity: The Same Problem from 
Different Perspectives 
 
Although the two problems of unstable enablers and external validity 
have a different source, when it comes to the structure of inference there 
is a sense in which they are equivalent. This suggests a deeper 
epistemological question that needs answering and also that there might 
possibly be a common answer to them both. 
 
We worry about “unstable enablers” when we study a particular case – 
e.g. a set of agents, the direction of a particular effect, a particular 
variable –  and we care to keep studying this case in midst of a – possibly 
– changing background structure. The problem of “unstable enablers” 
becomes visible after we have identified a causal relationship (e.g. 
pushing down the lever producing toast, putting the pound coin in the 
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slot producing a packet of crisps, the mass of the sun causing the earth to 
orbit around it, stepping on the throttle causing the car to accelerate) 
within some perceived structure; some possibly actual but for our 
purposes conceptualized space (like a toaster, the vending machine, the 
planetary system or a Rover 500 automobile). We take the case we are 
interested in as momentarily fixed against this underlying structure and 
worry about how the changing structure may affect what we care about. 
(e.g. What would happen if the toaster were wet? If the machine ran out 
of crisps?, etc.) The problem of “unstable enablers” speaks of shifts of 
known and unknown structural factors which seem to happen in time 
and affect the case we fixed our interest on.  
  
Compare this with the problem of “external validity”. External validity 
becomes an issue when we shift our interest from a case already studied 
to one, hopefully similar, but other than the one studied. We think of the 
problem as arising when we export causal knowledge gained from a 
particular case to some new situation of interest. (e.g. Does pressing down 
the lever work in any toaster? Is the collision impact on the test dummy 
the impact suffered by the driver of a Rover 500?, etc.) The problem of 
“external” validity speaks of changes as arising when we move in space, 
from places “interior” to those “exterior” to our case study. So we might 
say that the problem becomes relevant when we think of causal 
knowledge as shifted across space rather than when things change with 
time.  
 
Let’s take a step of abstraction. Using “space” and “time” variables, Σ and 
T, we could re-describe the two problems as follows:  
 
1. Unstable Enablers:  
Hypothesis & Structure (Σ1, T1) => Conclusion 
but Hypothesis & Structure' (Σ1, T2) =>New Conclusion 
2. External Validity:   
Hypothesis & Setting (Σ1, T1) => Conclusion 
but Hypothesis & Setting' (Σ2, T1) => New Conclusion 
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The differences in the effect depend on change that occurs across a 
perceived temporal or a spatial setting: 
 
1. Unstable Enablers: ∆Ε= φ (∆T) 
2. External Validity:  ∆Ε= ψ (∆Σ) 
 
The “space” and “time” variables, Σ and T, here do not refer to physical 
space-time, but rather to dimensions of our experience (or better yet, our 
talk) of things causally interacting in physical space-time. But the way we 
talk about these problems is contingent. If we think of these dimensions 
as interchangeable, talking about here and there becomes the same as 
talking about now and then. When we take the instability of causal 
enablers as arising in time, before and after we modify policy say, we get 
what we have termed the problem of “unstable enablers”; when we take 
the instabilities of causal factors to occur across space – from the test 
population to a target population say – we get the problem of external 
validity. The two problems are equivalent in this sense (Figure 1 depicts 
how the distinction is made). 
 
 
Figure 1 What changes from one labelled problem to another is what holds our interest not 
the logical structure of the situation. 
 
(1) Unstable Enablers: interest (i) fixed on          (2) External Validity: interest (i) shifted to  
a case; worry about how background  a case “outside” the case studied; worry  
affects the case studied      about whether our case applies here 
 
So what? There is no denying that unstable enablers and external validity 
are different methodological problems for us. Well, two things are made 
visible here. First, that we need to address both problems when drawing 
up our methodology at the same time. The problem of external validity it 
Background 
 
case 
i 
case 
i 
 
 
 
Background 
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would seem is always present no matter (or on top of) whether we take 
the “underlying” causal structure to be changing or stable. Conversely, 
why should we think that the underlying structures are stable during the 
time it takes us to export our causal knowledge? Looking at the two 
problems from the perspective of changes in ‘space’ and ‘time’ brings 
home how likely it is that we face both problems much of the time.  
 
Besides noting that the two problems are probably happening at the same 
time [for which one can argue without abstractions] our point is to note 
that the problems share a form and may also share a solution on a more 
abstract theoretical plane than either policy or methodology.21 
 
 
IV. Cartwright’s Causal Laws and Capacities 
 
Cartwright’s account of causal laws takes singular causation as primary 
and builds laws from there: C causes E in Ф if and only if some C’s 
regularly cause E’s in Ф (in the ‘long run’).  Cartwright then argues that 
where probabilities apply, the probabilistic theory of causality as 
formulated in section II.2 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for 
causal laws. This is a good study to consider because it has all the 
problems we raise, writ large. As a version of the probabilistic theory, this 
account of causal laws is entirely rooted in a hunting methodology, a very 
reliable methodology if ideally carried through, but concomitantly very 
narrow in the range of the claims established and hence of extremely 
limited use. This is reflected in the fact that causal laws, as Cartwright 
sees them, are always relative; in her account they are relative both to a 
particular arrangement of confounders and to the nomological machine – 
the underlying structure –  that gives rise to the causal regularity.22 This 
                                                 
21 For further discussion see Efstathiou (manuscript) “From Methods to Use: Is there a Here and 
There?”. 
22 Cf Cartwright (1989), Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement, Oxford University Press. Also note 
as in section II.2 that we can drop the relativization to the arrangement of confounders by relativizing 
instead to a population. Clearly C will cause some E’s in a population if it is guaranteed to cause some 
E’s in some subpopulation of that population (ie. a subpopulation that is homogeneous with respect to 
confounding factors). 
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means Cartwright’s causal laws are fragile: they are open to both the 
problems of external validity and of unstable enablers. 
 
What then about use? Cartwright gets this by an altogether different 
route, not from causal laws at all but from capacities. Capacities are 
powers that agents possess to contribute in a fixed way to what results 
whenever they are present. For example, because of their nuclear 
structure permanent magnets have the capacity to attract metallic objects. 
This is a capacity we measure in various experiments but the experiments 
themselves are not enough to tell us that there is a capacity to be 
measured in the first place. The claim that magnets have such a capacity 
is grounded in a large extended and complicated network of theory, 
experiment and successful prediction.  
 
Because the capacity will produce its contribution whenever it is present 
(or is properly triggered)23 knowledge of capacities can be extremely 
useful. But beware. For the magnet, ‘attraction’ is the contribution, not 
the actual motion (or not) that occurs when the magnet operates. The 
attraction is always there even if the metallic object never moves. This is 
a piece of information we can use reliably across a huge variety of 
situations. But the predictions it gives rise to may not be as helpful as we 
wish. The metallic earring is stuck between the floorboards. Shall we buy 
a magnet to get it out? We can reliably predict that the magnet will 
attract the earring but we need a whole lot more information to predict 
that the earring will move. The most we can definitely predict with the 
kind of knowledge we usually have in these situations is that the magnet 
may very well pick up the earring that fell between the floorboards.  
 
So, even with capacities, predictive power is weak. But that is not the 
point here. What matters for our worries about causal laws is that causal 
laws and capacities are entirely distinct. This is so even if one has a very 
different account of causal laws from Cartwright’s. None of the accounts 
of causal laws currently discussed in philosophy look anything like an 
                                                 
23 Except for chancy capacities, which produce their contributions only spasmodically. 
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account of capacities; nor do our standard methods for testing causal laws 
serve well for establishing capacities. Capacities can be of use for 
predicting what happens when we set policy or build new technological 
devices. That, however, does not salvage causal laws. In introducing 
capacities Cartwright never meant to undermine causal laws. But 
focussing on the distinction between capacities and causal laws points up 
the problem in bold relief: we are very good at finding out about causal 
laws; but once we have done so, of what possible use are they? 
 
V. Solutions? 
 
There are a number of strategies one might adopt to deal with worries 
about the usefulness of causal laws. None really work.  
 
a. Chuck Causal Laws. The first, obvious solution to these problems is to 
chuck causal laws. Go for what you need. In Cartwright’s case this is 
capacities. It is not a causal law that is in operation whenever the magnet 
succeeds in picking up the earring. It is instead the capacity. But 
Cartwright’s account is metaphysically heavy. It postulates powers and in 
exactly the way Hume despised. Capacities require a three-fold 
distinction between 1) the presence of the capacity (e.g. whenever the 
magnet is present so too is the capacity to attract metallic objects); 2) the 
exercise of the capacity (the attracting of the earring) and 3) the actual 
result (the movement – or not – of the earring). Hume allows at most two 
of these but all three are necessary to do the job. 
 
If we follow Sandra Mitchell’s attack on ‘laws’, we can also chuck 
causality.24 Mitchell points out that for use we do not need laws; ipso 
facto we do not need causal laws. Any truth can be useful so long as it is 
true where you propose to use it for prediction.  
 
                                                 
24 Sandra Mitchell (2003) Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, 
stresses the need for invariance without a detour through causality. 
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Classic instrumentalism can also be seen as a way of chucking causality 
and going directly for what we need, much along the lines of the proposal 
we take from Mitchell. Science need not establish laws; what’s needed are 
instruments that give us correct (enough) results for the predictions we 
want to make. 
 
As liberating as it sounds, chucking causality doesn’t get rid of our 
troubles. First of all it does not salvage causal laws. Are these just a 
wasted effort after all? Second, we still need to be told both how to 
establish and how to use whatever substitute notions are proposed. 
Which claims will be true in a particular setting, how should we use 
them and how do we establish that they will be true? Chucking causality 
gives no bridge from language entry to exit; from method to use. It just 
promises you can build another bridge, further down the road.  
 
b. Dubbing. A second solution is to go for what you need and dub it 
causality. This approach is typical in econometrics. What makes for 
causality in econometrics is “structure”, represented in structural 
equations. So, what’s structure? Structural equations are more or less the 
ones that can be relied on for the predictions we want. But again this 
builds no bridge from language entry to exit; from method to use. 
Econometrics is very good at telling how to estimate parameters in 
structural equations – this looks much like language entry. But there’s no 
good theory of what structure is that fits with both some good theory of 
‘model adequacy’ – what makes it okay to assert a set of ‘structural’ 
equations in the face of data – and simultaneously with the assumption 
that the model can be used for prediction under intervention or in new 
situations.  
 
To reinforce this point, let us turn to an account of causality offered by 
macroeconomist and methodologist Kevin Hoover that seems geared very 
much to use, unlike the philosophical accounts we have looked at so far 
and more like familiar manipulation and intervention accounts in 
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philosophy.25 (We discuss Hoover rather than the philosophers in part as 
a way of introducing his work to readers outside the philosophy of 
economics and partly because we can illustrate our point so cleanly with 
it.) Hoover defines causality directly in terms of the effects that can be 
achieved by manipulation, real manipulation. 
 
Hoover: C causes E iff anything we can do to fix C partially fixes E 
but not the reverse.26 
 
Although this definition secures a connection between causation and 
manipulation the kinds of relations it calls ‘causal’ would not count as 
causal in everybody’s books – like probabilistic theories of causation, 
causal process theories or Lewis-style counterfactual accounts. Figure 2 
provides an example of a simple mechanism to illustrate, where the u’s 
are ‘policy levers’ – quantities we can manipulate, and the solid lines with 
arrows depict pure ‘mechanical’ causation, like pushing on a lever at one 
end to trip a switch at the other. The dotted line depicts ‘Hoover’ 
causation. 
                     
         Figure 2                                        ux 
 
     
                                                  x           uz  
 
 
                                        y           z 
                                                 
25 See Kevin Hoover (2001) Causality in Macroeconomics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. It 
should be noted that the description given here of Hoover’s account is not one he is happy with. 
Cartwright claims it is what his definitions say and take the kind of causal relation described by the 
definitions as a very important one different from more ‘mechanical’ kinds of causal relations. He 
maintains that he intends his account to cover the more conventional notion of ‘mechanical causation’ 
and that various caveats he offers allow his definitions to do so. For further discussion, see Cartwright 
(2007) Hunting Causes and Using Them, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 14. 
26 Hoover causation thus is closely associated with the kind of ‘implementation neutral’ counterfactual 
that Daniel Hausman proposes for investigating casual claims, but with the range of implementations 
restricted to implementations we are able to bring about. See Cartwright (2007) Hunting Causes and 
Using Them, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 16. 
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If Hoover27 is right about what causation is, we can see why causes by 
their very nature can provide predictions about strategies for 
manipulating the world. But many will not want to allow that Hoover’s is 
an account of causation at all. More important, the account is entirely 
rooted in use and does not does not supply any bridge to get there from 
method. Knowing Hoover-causal facts will certainly be helpful in 
predicting the effects of policy interventions. But how does one learn 
these facts in the first place? Indeed many standard methods for causal 
inference will yield wrong verdicts vis-à-vis Hoover causation (e.g. 
methods that look for causal processes and physical connections), many 
will often not be applicable (e.g. Galilean experiments and Lewis 
counterfactual investigation in cases where the ‘miracle’-like 
intervention is not among those we can do), and many will give ‘no’ 
answers to causal relations where a more nuanced verdict would be of far 
more help (e.g. where E changes under some manipulations of C but not 
others, C will not Hoover-cause E). 
 
c. Add-ons. A third way is to be more demanding. Require conditions for 
both method and use. Woodward takes this route. Besides level 
invariance he requires ‘modularity’ for a relationship to pass as a causal 
law.  
 
Modularity: there must be at least one way to ‘intervene’ to change 
any genuine cause.28 
  
The effect of this requirement is that each variable appearing in a causal 
law operating in a situation can be changed without changing anything 
else except the effects of changing that variable.  This again is a ‘miracle’-
like change. What justifies this as a condition on causality? Woodward is 
                                                 
27 Or better, with footnote 25 in mind, ‘Hoover as described here’. 
28 This is not exactly how Woodward defines modularity but it is how he uses the notion sometimes 
and especially to do just the job discussed here. See Woodward’s definition of modularity in Woodward 
(2003) Making Things Happen, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 329. 
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clear:29 this addition allows us to use the relation in question for 
predictions about manipulations. That, we take it, is why Woodward calls 
his account of causality indifferently an ‘invariance’ account and a 
‘manipulability’ account.  
 
As an answer to our worries it is not satisfactory however. First, it 
underwrites the use of causal laws for predicting the outcomes of 
manipulations not for the manipulations we might be envisaging, but 
only for very special kinds of miracle-like interventions that change the 
cause and nothing else. These are the kinds of manipulations that are 
demanded in a Galilean experiment or in Lewis-style counterfactuals. 
That may well be how they come to play such a special role in 
Woodward’s account. They are good for a very special way of testing for 
causal laws. But they are no good for showing why knowledge of causal 
laws is useful for real policy predictions. 
 
In this respect econometricians David Hendry and Robert Engle do 
better.30 First they require that causes be exogenous.31 This is a technical 
notion that has to do with efficient estimation from data. That facilitates 
language entry. What about language exit? They require that as well: 
before they will call a relation ‘causal’ they demand that it not only be 
exogenous but also ‘superexogenous’, which is a relative notion. A 
relation is superexogenous relative to an envisaged policy change just in 
case it will remain true under that change.  
 
Accounts like Woodward’s and Hendry and Engle’s are what we call 
‘add-on’ accounts. They do not provide an account, a theory, of causality 
                                                 
29 Actually, he gives the same reason – causes must be usable to manipulate their effects – for both level 
invariance and for modularity. We cite it only for modularity because level invariance does not provide 
manipulability unless modularity is added and Cartwright at any rate has an alternative defense of level 
invariance. 
30 See Hendry (2001) Causality in Macroeconomics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and 
Hendry (2004) ‘Causality and Exogeneity in Non-stationary Economic Time-Series’, Causality: 
Metaphysics and Methods Technical Report CTR 18-04, CPNSS, London School of Economics and 
Engle, R. , Hendry, D. and Richard, J. F. (1983), “Exogeneity”, Econometrica, 51, 277-304.  
31 Also, in line with the probabilistic theory of causality there is in general the assumption that causes 
and effects are probabilistically dependent. 
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rich enough to justify our usual rules for both language entry and 
language exit for causal laws. In particular they offer nothing that shows 
why our standard methods for inferring causal laws leads us to claims 
that can be used in the ways proposed. They just refuse to call something 
a causal law unless it can both be admitted by their favourite test for 
causality AND can be relied on for the kinds of predictions they describe.  
 
This is no bridge at all from method to use. It is mere mereology. And 
mereology will not save causal laws. Without the assurance of a bridge 
from standard method to use, the assumption that the claim can be used 
in the ways described needs to be established on its own, independently. 
But then why bother with the first half to begin with? What’s the point 
of all the time, money, thought and effort that goes into putting the 
causal label on through careful use of our best methods if the tests that do 
all the work in justifying our prediction are altogether different ones? If 
mereology is the only alternative left, it seems preferable to give up on 
causality altogether and instead adopt one of the first two strategies: give 
up on causal laws and establish what we need. Then call it causality if 
you like  
 
VI. Aside: Woodward versus Cartwright  
 
It might be useful before concluding to juxtapose Cartwright’s capacities 
and Woodward’s modularity demand. Woodward’s conditions on 
causality concern whole equations: 
 
z = ax +by 
 
If an equation is level invariant under miracle-like interventions on 
right-hand-side variables, it must be a causal law under Cartwright’s 
axioms. Modularity demands that we call it a causal law only if there is a 
miracle-like intervention for each right-hand-side variable.   
 
Cartwright’s capacities are causal tendencies associated with individual 
features. The strength of capacities is measured in Galilean experiments. 
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In an equation like the one above, if the quantities designated by x and y 
both have capacities with respect to z, then ‘a’ is the strength of x’s 
capacity to produce z and ‘b’ is the strength of y’s capacity to produce z. 
Note that there is no assumption that the equation is invariant. What 
equation holds is relative to a particular setting, a particular arrangement 
of causes. The coefficients however are invariant. The hypothesis that x 
and y have capacities with respect to z guarantees that they make the 
same contribution (viz ax and by) whenever they are present. So they can 
be used to build new equations to describe situations where they are 
present with other causes and without each other. 
 
Woodward’s mechanisms and Cartwright’s capacities are both difficult to 
establish. Beyond that though they have complementary limitations and 
advantages. For Woodward, the whole causal equation is invariant. This 
is good for prediction but bad for scope; we are restricted to predictions 
in new situations that have exactly the same set of causes operating. 
Further, Woodward causal laws describe what happens under miracle-
like interventions. This is again bad for scope. We cannot easily perform 
miracles so our causal laws won’t help much with predictions about real 
life changes. Still, for Woodward there is at least a way to use a causal law 
for prediction and maybe we’d better just find that way. 
 
Capacities on the contrary are good for scope. Once established capacities 
can be carried to new settings (addressing worries of external validity) 
and even, for ‘fundamental’ capacities, across different underlying 
structures (dealing with unstable enablers).32 For example, now that it has 
been established that magnets have the capacity to attract metallic 
objects, the attraction may be confidently relied on in new settings.  But 
capacities are not as good as we might hope for prediction. What is 
guaranteed with a capacity is that it will produce a fixed contribution. 
That’s the bit that Hume would not like. What actually happens is far 
                                                 
32 A good many capacities are derivative however. These too will depend on the underlying structure, 
or ‘nomological machine’, that gives rise to them.  
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harder to predict since it depends on what other causes are operating and 
what all their contributions together add up to. 
 
There are nice cases of course, in the sciences, where we know a set of 
capacities, each with its fixed contribution, and we also know a rule of 
composition for how the contributions ‘add’.33 Forces in mechanics and 
their rule of vector addition is the paradigm. And it is this paradigm that 
Mill turns to when he defends the role of stable tendencies (from which 
Cartwright’s capacities are copied) in the economy. But as Anna 
Alexandrova and Julian Reiss argue, both from their studies of  economic 
models,34 for most cases, even cases where we are strongly inclined to 
ascribe capacities, Mill’s hope for a rule of composition is daft.  
 
Consider for example the case of the subjugation of women. We might 
well admit that women do have the capacity for leadership and 
intelligence. What will result when this capacity operates in a variety of 
real-life settings? Is it really reasonable to assume that in each setting, a 
set, albeit possibly a large one, of other causes each with its own capacity 
is at work and that the outcome of all acting together can be calculated 
by a fixed rule of composition? Even in the case of the magnet this 
picture seems suspicious. To be sure, there are cases where all the causes 
affecting the motion of a metallic object can be represented neatly as 
vector forces, the magnetic force among, and the resultant motion 
calculated via vector addition and the rule that the acceleration of the 
metallic object equals the resultant force divided by the object’s mass. But 
it is a huge leap of faith to suppose that the dust and spider webs between 
the floorboards can be regimented into this neat picture. The best 
Cartwright would be prepared to bet is true is that the magnet could well 
lift the earring. And this remains a weak prediction!  
                                                 
33 Indeed, in most cases it is just because we know both a rule of composition and the contribution of a 
full set of causes towards the effect that we can make sense of the idea of a contribution from any one 
of them. 
34 Cf. Anna Alexandrova (2006) ) “Connecting Economic Models to the Real World”, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 36: 173-192 and Julian Reiss (2007) Error in Economics: The Methodology of Evidence-
Based Economics, London: Routledge.  
 
 28 
 
 
VII. Two Actions, Two Shores, Two Problems 
  
We have distinguished between  
1. two actions: hunting causes and using causes  
taking place on 
2. two shores: methodology and policy  
that cannot be bridged because of 
3. two problems: unstable enablers and external validity.  
 
Together these paint a sad picture for causal laws. On current accounts it 
is either easy to explain why some one or another of our best methods for 
hunting causal laws should be reliable or it is easy to account for why 
causal laws can be used for predictions when we propose to change the 
world. But no account on offer does both at once very well.  There are 
two obvious conclusions: 
 
Conclusion 1: The state of philosophy reflects the state of nature. Causal 
laws are not worth the paper they are written on. They can be found 
alright – and it is clear why our best methods for finding them work so 
well: they just are ‘that which results from this method’. Or they can be 
used just as we want. But our elaborate methods for testing are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for claims that give true conclusions about policy 
manipulations. So we might as well chuck all those elaborate tests. 
 
Conclusion 2: There is a lot of work left for philosophy to do: to find 
good, rich theories of causality that support method and use in one fell 
swoop.  
 
We can hope for Conclusion 2, but as always the proof of the pudding 
will be when we have the theory on our plate and have cut it open to 
find inside not just one but the two sixpences of hunting and use 
together. 
